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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
The brief of appellants Coeur d'Alene Land Company and H. F. 
Magnuson accurately states the nature of this case. Respondent Neighbors for 
Responsible Growth, et al would, in addition, make the following observations 
peculiar to this case. 
After cor~sideration of several potentially dispositive motions made by 
intervenors, District Judge Charles W. Hosack, held a hearing on the merits on 
June 5, 2007. Extensive briefing by all parties had been made on the 
dispositive motions and was made before and after the hearing on the merits. 
Based on Idaho Code §67-6509 (b) and the Court's reading of the opinion in 
Price v. Payette County, 131 Idaho 426, 958 P.2d 583 (1998), Judge Hosack 
ordered a remand to the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners to hold a 
second hearing. Judge Hosack's ruling was that Price v. Payette County 
required a second hearing whenever the initial order of the board of county 
commissioners .was contrary to the decision of the county planning and zoning 
commission on, a comprehensive plan amendment as it was in this case. 
Instead of pursuing the remand, appellants filed separate notices of appeal. 
Kootenai County, which had nominally shared in the position of the intervenors 
on the merits in the intervenors motions, did not file a notice of appeal nor has 
I 
the county participated in the appea1.<tl 
T., p. 33, L. 2 - 16. 
The appeal raises interesting legal issues such as whether this amendment 
to the comprehensive plan is a legislative action not subject to judicial review. 
However, the developer strategy raises a question worthy of note. 
A second hearing after an initial decision is certainly appropriate for 
careful review. As a practical matter, the second hearing by the same board of 
county commissioners is far more likely than not to produce the same result. 
Typically commissioners, being human, are most likely to act as do trial judges 
on motions for reconsideration to conclude that they were right the first time in 
the absence of some dramatic change in the record. 
In this case there was a dramatic change, not in the record, but in the 
commission itself. The commission votes in November of 2006 in favor of 
Powderhom and Magnuson were by Katie Brodie and Gus Johnson with Rick 
Currie voting against. Brodie and Johnson had been defeated in the Republican 
primary in May of 2006 by Todd Tondee and Richard Piazza who made 
1Kootenai County joined in oral argument on the side of the Neighbors in seeking a 
stay upon the zoning application made by the intervenors. County attorney John Cafferty 
expressed the desire of the county to keep the record clean and concentrated upon the 
comprehensive plan amendment without additional complications that would come from 
allowing the zonil)g to proceed. Tr., p. 33, L. 2 - 16. 
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campaign issues out of uncontrolled development being allowed in Kootenai 
County. 
If the second hearing had been conducted upon remand, the decision 
would have been made not by the same three who voted in November of 2006, 
but by the dissenter and now Chairman Rick Currie and newcomers Tondee and 
Piazza. Powderhom and Magnuson had very good reasons in choosing to make 
a costly appeal in the hope of reversal by this. Court rather than risk another 
hearing by the new board of county commissioners. (Z) 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The course of proceeding set forth in Appellants Powderhom 
Communities, LLC and Heartland LLC's Brief is chronologically accurate. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Petitioners/Respondents Neighbors et al are affected persons within the 
meaning oftheLocal Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code §67-6521 (1) (a) and 
( d). All of the named organizations were represented by members testifying 
2The second hearing on remand could have been held within two months after 
judgment was entered on August 29, 2007. Although no hearing has been set on this appeal, it 
is likely to be in the fall term of 2008 with a decision that likely would not be until after 
January 1, 2009. As attorney Mischelle Fulgham has repeatedly told Judge Hosack, any delay 
would be very costly to Powderhom. Tr., p. 14, L. 2 - 23. Given the dramatic down tum in 
the real estate market in Kootenai County, the lawsuit by Neighbors may in fact have saved 
the developers money by preventing expenditures for constructions for the lots that would not 
sell. 
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before the Kootenai County Planning Commission and the Kootenai County 
Board of Commissioners at the hearings on the proposed amendment to the 
comprehensive plan. The named individuals in the appeal as petitioners were 
each owners having an interest in real property adversely impacted by those 
proposed massive change in land use contemplated in the 3,000 acres sought to 
be rezoned. 
On behalf of the Kootenai County Building and Planning Department, 
Mark Mussman, Planner III, prepared the "Staff Report" to Case No. CP-080-05 
under date of April 19, 2006. Agency Record, Vol. 1, pp. 131 - 138. 
The report of the planning commission public hearing is in the 
Supplemental Transcript, Volume 1. The deliberations of the planning 
commission on May 25th are in the first transcript at pages 1 to 17. At those 
deliberations, the plaiming commission voted unanimously to recommend 
rejection of the. application of Powderhom Communities, LLC to amend the 
comprehensive plan. Transcript, p. 17, L. 2 - 15. Before doing so, the members 
took careful note of the Staff Report prepared by Planner Mussman. Transcript, 
p. 14, L. 21 - 24; p. 15, L. l - 7. 
In voting to recommend rejection of the amendment, the planning 
commission was accepting the Staff Report as its findings and conclusions. 
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Chairman S.J. "Gus" Johnson and Katie Brodie voted in open meeting in 
October 5, 2006 to approve the application of Powderhom Communities, LLC 
for a Comprehensive Plan amendment. Transcript, p. 234, L. 15 - 25. On 
November 9, 2006, the board executed the Findings of Fact, Applicable Legal 
Standards, Conclusions of Law, Comprehensive Plan Analysis and Order of 
Decision. Agency Record, Case No. CP-080-05, Vol. 3, pp. 601-613. 
On November 16, 2006 Chairman Johnson and Commissioner Brodie 
signed a newly drafted "Amended Order of Decision." Agency Record, Vol. 3, 
pp. 590 - 600. 
Paragraph VII, "Order of Decision" was identical in the Amended Order 
executed November 16th to Paragraph VII, "Order of Decision" executed 
November 9th. Agency Record, Vol. 3, p. 599 and p. 613. 
A significant number of the Findings of Fact and the comprehensive plan 
Analysis in the original November 9th Order which supported, or at least by 
inference, lent credibility to the opposition of petitioners were substantially 
altered to the reverse in the November 16th Amended Order. 
Verbatim comparisons of certain of the Findings of Fact and 
Comprehensive Plan Analysis in the November 9th Order with the November 
16th Amended Order were attached Exhibit A to Petitioner's Opening Brief and 
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are attached as Exhibit A to this brief. The alt.erations are striking. R., pp. 185-
190. 
What is shown in the administrative record here is that the board initially 
accepted the Staff Report findings that did not support its decision rejecting the 
recommendations of the planning commission which had adopted the Staff 
Report. 
The initial flashing of red light and danger warning "Don't Go There" is 
under the heading of "Transportation". The direct and chosen access from 
Coeur d'Alene to the Powderhom Bay Peninsula is Highway 97. This is what 
the planning commission found under the "Transportation" heading: 
Transportation 
4.07 Goal 14: Provide for the efficient, safe, and cost-effective 
movement of people of goods. Assist in the operation and orderly 
expansion of the Coeur d'Alene Airport. 
If developed, this project will add substantially to the traffic on Highway 
97. It is widely recognized that little can be done to increase the 
capacity of Highway 97. Although the Applicant states that any future 
development on the property will be seasonal in nature, the increase in 
traffic will occur during the summer months when the traffic on 
Highway 97 traditionally increases. The Applicant has included 
proposed changes to the Transportation element of the Comprehensive 
Plan that may address some of the issues involved with increased 
development in the area. However, it is still unclear whether any 
amount of mitigation for Highway 97 will prevent further degradation of 
its level of service. 
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Agency Record, Vol. 1, p. 136. 
As to Highway 97, nothing changed between the planning commission 
hearing and the subsequent board of commissioners hearings, but the access 
problem was initially smudged in the original November 9th Order and then 
with the Amended Order, made to disappear. The November 9th's initial Order 
repeated verbatim the planning commission for Section 4.07 but added: 
That being said, the present application is not for any development and 
if the applicants desire to pursue development they will have to undergo 
additional administrative review. 
Agency Record, Vol. 3, p. 611. 
After the appeal was filed, the Amended Order had only the additional 
one sentence followed by: 
Safety issues associated with Highway 97 will need significant 
consideration. 
Agency Record, Vol. e, p. 598. 
The testimony and written evidence related to Highway 97 submitted to 
the planning commission and to the board of commissioners was overwhelming 
negative and unrebutted. 
In testimony before the board, Sylvia Lampard, a year around resident 
living off Highway 97 with a Harrison address, gave detailed testimony based 
upon personal observations and measurements. Transcript, p. 54, L. 11 -25; p. 
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55, L. 1 -25; p. 56, L. 1-3. From I-90 to the East Point Road turnout to the 
project, there are 209 entries onto Highway 97 carrying significant traffic. 
Sylvia counted 50 south facing official ITD road signs indicating sharp curves 
and these were understated because some read "Curves North Next Two Miles." 
There was only one passing lane. Much of Highway 97 had steep 
dropoffs on one side and high banks on the other. Sylvia's final observation 
was noting greatly increased traffic generated from construction work on 
Gozzer Ranch which is at the north end of Highway 97 as it approached Coeur 
D'Alene Lake. 
There is no question that the construction of the golf course plus 
equestrian trails, service buildings and 1,300 houses would result in far more 
congestion, danger and highway damage. 
Other residents made similar observations about present condition on 
Highway 97. Jackie McNamara, Transcript, p. 50, L. 2 - 25; p. 51, L. 1-4; Bill 
Lampard, p. 75, L. 12 - 22; Jean Nelson, p. 77, L. 21 - 25; p. 78, L. 1 - 23. 
As it happened Jon Ingalls, who has property along Highway 07 and who 
testified before the planning commission in opposition, was Coeur d'Alene City 
Street Supervisor for many years. This is part of what Jon Ingalls said: 
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Michael Purcelli of the Idaho Transportation Department says IDT 
has ongoing concerns with the cumulative impacts on the 
developments on the side of Coeur d'Alene Lake have on the roads 
and highways in the area. Uh, planning staff, there, the staff reports 
says it's premature to pass any change in this area until the status of 
Highway 97 has been determined. 
Transcript p. 70, L. 2- 10, L. 19 - 25; p. 71, L. 1 - 4. 
The response on behalf of Powderhom before the planning commission 
was both relatively honest and woefully inadequate. Christine Fueston, 
engineer for the applicant, told the planning commission that Powderhom 
Communities would contribute funds to a proposed study by the Kootenai 
Metropolitan Planning Organization (KMPO); the study might get started in the 
summer of 2006 if the local match of $50,000 for the total study costs of 
$250,000 could be found. Supplemental Transcript, p. 22, L. 19 - 25; p. 22, L. 
1-6. 
At the planning commission hearing on April 27, 2006, Commissioner 
Kathlene Kolts gave the realistic final conclusion as to Highway 97: 
By Commissioner Kolts: But even so, these people still have to go to 
grocery stores, there's still big trucks on this road. That road is 
crumbling and eroding and I think there are a lot of people in this 
room who want to know how will you mitigate that and where is the 
money going to come from to do this especially since you won't be the 
last project that is asking for development out there. 
Supplemental Transcript, p. 28, L. 16 - 72. 
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The 26 miles from I-90 to the turn off to the Powderhom Bay 
development is state highway. As a matter of law, a private developer cannot 
alter or improve that highway. In any event, that cost would exceed the post-
development land value. 
Some of the goals in the 1994 comprehensive plan are commendable and 
achievable but not of great impact, e.g. Goal 22, Education, school 
representatives to participate in planning. For Goal 14 Transportation, the most 
important word is "safe." 
Allowing great increase in traffic, first in construction and then 
quadruplicating the daily residential use creates a life and death question. The 
citizen testimony based on first hand knowledge of the complete inadequacy of 
Highway 97 today was umebutted and insoluble in the future. In approving the 
amendment, the board recklessly disregarded "safe." 
Any change in the comprehensive plan made at a time other than the total 
rewrite and adoption of an updated plan must meet the applicable goals 
established in that governing comprehensive plan. The planning commission by 
unanimous vote based on the staffs findings of facts and analysis of goals in the 
comprehensive .plan analysis found that the application did not support 
amendment. The board in its initial Order on November 9th substantially 
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adopted .the identical factual findings and goal analysis with occasional add-on 
contradictory or dismissive sentences. 
The series of goal violations begins with the most blatant and 
unfortunately the most common violation: "Goal 6: Preservation, Protection 
and Enhancement of Fish and Wildlife Habitats." Except for Whitetail Deer and 
raccoons, development never preserves, protects or enhances wildlife habitat. 
See January 2~, 2006 letter from Idaho Fish and Game Regional Director Chip 
Corsi concluding that the proposed amendment to the comprehensive plan "will 
reduce the capability of Kootenai County to support future wildlife populations." 
Agency Record, Vol. 1, pp. 180 -181. 
Without any support in the record from an credible source, the Amended 
Order reads that "impacts on wildlife can be minimized and habitat improved for 
some species.''; This is pure speculation totally without foundation. 
In Goal JO "Population," the planning commission was negative. 
Population gro:wth would be directed to an area sparsely populated; wildlife 
habitat and corridors would be severely affected with this dagger in the heart of 
Heartland, LL<;::: 
Additio11ally, this request will have a dramatic affect on the quality of 
life to the property owners of the area. 
Agency Record, Vol. 1, p. 136. 
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The testimony and letters of opposition both before the planning 
commission and the board were largely about the negative effect on the quality 
of life. The November 9th Order followed the above statement with a sentence 
in direct contradiction, a ying/yang: 
However, the proposed change to Rural, from Agricultural, will 
maintain the character of the area and comport with the actual use of 
the requested properties as well as the surrounding areas. 
Agency Record, Vol. 3, p. 610. 
The November 16th Amended Order struck the first sentence leaving only 
that there would be no change in the character of the area. Agency Record, 
Vol. 3, pp. 597-610. 
Goal 26 is to "Foster growth in a manner which does not compromise the 
visual qualities of Kootenai County" and Goal 27 is similarly environmentally 
protective. The planning commission accurately recognized the violation as did 
the November 9th Order: 
The public comment generated by this request suggests that this 
amendment, to the extent that it culminates in subsequent 
development, will compromise the visual qualities of Kootenai County. 
Both the response of the planning commission and the initial decision of 
the board recognized that public comment properly carried weight. Replete 
throughout the public testimony and letters at all stages are pleas to protect the 
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visual qualities and what the residents regarded as natural landmarks and areas 
of scenic beauty. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Do Price v. Payette County, 131 Idaho 426, 958 P.2d 583 (1998) 
and Idaho Code §67-6509 (b) support the order of the District Court remanding 
administrative Case CP080-05 Powderhorn Communities, LLC to the board of 
county commissioners for a second hearing? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
Neighbors accept the standard of review set forth in the Magnuson brief 
quoting from Spencer v. Kootenai County, 08.6 ISCR 263 (March 6, 2008) at 
p. 4. 
B. Amendment to Comprehensive Plan is an Appealable Agency 
Action. 
The application by Powderhorn and Magnuson to amend the 
comprehensive plan from Agricultural to Rural on 3,000 acres was a contested 
case within the meaning of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. Idaho 
Code §67-5201 (6). A person aggrieved by a final order of an agency in a 
contested case is entitled as a matter of right to judicial review. Idaho Code §67-
5270 (3). 
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In McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993), the 
Idaho Supreme Court, specifically held that a property owner had standing and 
that the court had jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the comprehensive 
plan and general zoning even though the owner had not made a timely appeal at 
the time of enactment of the zoning code: 
Thus, this case is more like Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 
681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990). In Jerome, this Court stated that "the 
district court had jurisdiction to issue its declaratory judgment 
regarding the validity of the 1985 amendment to the [Jerome County] 
zoning ordinance," but appeals involving the issuance of a particular 
permit should be reviewed under the procedures established by the 
Local Planning Act. Jerome, 118 Idaho at 685, 799 P.2d at 973. See 
Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 66 n. 2, 665 P.2d 1075, 1076 
n. 2 (1983) ("While we hold that a legislative zoning decision is not 
subject to direct judicial review, it nonetheless may be scrutinized by 
means Qf collateral actions such as declaratory actions."). 
123 Idaho at 660. 
C. Powderhorn Comprehensive Plan Amendment not a Legislative Act 
The major issue raised by Powderhorn and Magnuson, briefed at length 
argued and decided by the district court, is whether amending the comprehensive 
plan is a legislative act not subject to court review. Powderhorn and Magnuson 
rely heavily upon Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 1073 
(1983). That case is distinguishable and the authorities cited in the opinion 
support the opposite conclusion. The issue before that court was the annexation 
14 
of property with the amendment to the comprehensive plan and the rezoning 
being merely the attendant actions mandated by Idaho Code §67-6525. 
Annexation is a legislative action. In Coeur d'Alene Industrial Park 
Property Owners Association, Inc. v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 108 Idaho 843, 702 
P.2d 881 (App. 1983), Judge Burnett for the Court of Appeals noted that 
annexation authority under Idaho Code §50-222 long predated the enactment of 
the Local Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code §§67-6501 et seq: 
The act,of annexation does not await an exercise of the zoning power. 
See Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho 65, 665 P.2d 1075 (1983). 
108 Idaho at 845. 
The out-of-Idaho supporting authorities cited in the quotation from Burt 
were to the Kansas opinion, Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 
584 P.2d 130 (1978) and to City of Louisville v. District Court of Boulder, 190 
Colo. 33, 543 P.2d 67 (Colo. 1975). The City of Louisville case involved only 
annexation. 
As it happens, the Colorado Court of Appeals in Condiutti v. Board of 
County Commissioners of the County of LaPlata, 983 P.2d 184 (Colo. App. 
1999), reversed the trial court's dismissal of a complaint by a property owner 
challenging the county order amending the land use system: 
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In our view, the same reasoning should apply to the present situation 
in which an owner is attempting to protect his property from adverse 
effects caused by the adoption of an amendment to a land use system. 
See Piscitelli v. Township Committee of Scotch Plains, 103 N.J. Super. 
589 248 A.2d 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 12968) (ownership of 
property in area affected by zoning is sufficient to create standing to 
contest validity of zoning ordinance); Zeltig Land Development Corp. 
v. Bainbridge Township Board of Trustees, 785 Ohio App.3d 302, 599 
N.E.2d 383 (1991) (owner had standing to challenge constitutionally of 
zoning as applied to its own property because owner may be limited 
by the zoning or may be harmed by restrictions placed on the 
property). 
983 P.2d at 187. 
1. Localized Amendments are Challengeable 
In all three adjoining states, the appellate courts have held that property 
owners have the absolute right to challenge amendments to a comprehensive 
plan or the comprehensive plan itself with no bar as "legislative action." In Ash 
Grove CementCompany v. Jefferson County, 943 P.2d 35 (Mont. 1997), the trial 
court and the Montana Supreme Court looked at and ruled in detail in a case 
seeking to overturn "a local vicinity plan" as being inconsistent with the 
county's master plan. 
Powderhom cited Jones v. King County, 74 Wash. App. 467, 874 P.2d 
853 (1994) as holding that the courts could not consider a suit challenging 
amendments to the comprehensive plan. Powderhom Brief, p. 18, fn. 13. 
The difficulty was examined in some detail in Holbrook, Inc. v. Clark 
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County, 112 Wash. App. 354, 49 P.3d 134 (Wash. App. Div. 2, 2002). In 1993, 
Holbrook bought 75 acres zoned "rural estate" which allowed five acre lots. 
At that time Clark County had initiated development of a comprehensive plan. 
This process continued for two years with all the attendant public hearings and 
published notice finally resulting in adoption in December of 1994 with the 
Holbrook property classified as Forest Resource Land allowing only 20 acre 
tracts. 49 P.3d at 144-145. 
Holbrook sued claiming due process violations. In affirming dismissal, the 
Court wrote: 
No bright line separates judicial from legislative actions. Raynes v. 
City of Leavenworth, 118 Wash.2d 237, 243, 821 P.2d 1204 (1992). 
But area-wide actions, such as the adoption of comprehensive plans 
and zoning ordinances, involving the exercise of the legislative body's 
policy-making role, are generally considered legislative. See Raynes, 
118 Wash.2d at 245-49, 821 P.2d 1204; Jones, 74 Wash.App. at 474-
75, 874 ;P.2d 853; see also RCW 42.36.010 . .. 
As Holbrook points out, there are circumstances in which even 
legislative decisions can give rise to individual constitutional due 
process :protections. When one person, or relative few people, are 
exceptionally affected by a decision on individual grounds, then such 
persons.may be entitled to basic due process rights, including 
individual notice. 
49 P.3d at 148 - 49. 
Exactly that circumstance in which people had standing to stop the 
adoption of a comprehensive plan occurred three years earlier in a Washington 
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Supreme Court case,-King County v. Central Puget Sound Growth, 138 Wash.2d 
161, 979 P.2d 374 (Wash. 1999). The short caption is misleading. The suit 
was an administrative appeal from King County's adoption of a comprehensive 
plan. The petitioners named in the full caption as appellants included eight 
governmental entities, twenty-seven corporations and organizations and five 
individuals. 
Even though the comprehensive plan covered a wide area, the Washington 
Supreme Court held that the environmental groups could challenge portions of 
the plan and that: 
Any individual, partnership, corporation, or other entity with 
standing may appeal a provision of a county's plan to ensure that it 
is in compliance with the requirements of the GMA. (Growth 
Management Act). 
RCW 36. 70A.280 (2)-(3). This appeal process benefits both those who 
seek to Jimit development and those who seek to protect their 
development rights. 
979 P.2d at 383. 
In the most recent reported case, Low Income Housing Institute v. 
Lakewood, 77 P.3d 653 (Wash. App. Div. 2, 2003), affordable housing 
advocated successfully challenged the City of Lakewood's comprehensive plan 
resulting in a remand to revise the plan. 77 P.3d at 658. 
In Oregon, arguably the state with the most extensive and detailed 
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planning process, the right of individual residents and of developers to sue 
entities upon the grounds of defective comprehensive plans has been recognized. 
With a very similar name, Neighbors for Livability v. City of Beaverton, 
168 Or. App. 501, 4 P.3d 765 (Or. App. 2000) was procedurally very like this 
case. The developers Sorrento Construction and others applied to the city to 
amend the comprehensive plan to change the designation of l O acres from 
residential to commercial. In opposition to Sorrento, the non-profit corporation 
, and eight individuals in the neighborhood went through the administrative levels 
and then filed the appeal with the Oregon Court of Appeals. The opinion 
recognized that the challenge was not to a present zone change but, as here, to 
the future intentions of the developer as were fully disclosed in the record: 
Although respondent Sorrento Construction's (Sorrento) application 
and the city's decision directly sought and granted only the plan 
amendments, and did not include related zoning changes or specific 
developmental permits, the ultimate objective of both Sorrento and 
the city is to develop a supermarket complex at the Murray site. 
4 P.3d at 766. 
The opinion gave careful consideration to all of the petitioners' claims and 
then affirmed the city's approval without ever suggesting that the amendment 
was a legislative action. 
The distinction between the city or county created broad and 
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encompassing comprehensive plans which must be a legislative act and this 
amendment for a specific tract of land was succinctly explained by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in Golden v. City of Overland Park, supra: 
A city, in enacting a general zoning ordinance, or a planning 
commission exercising its primary and principal function under 
K.S.A. 12-704 in adopting and annually reviewing a comprehensive 
plan for development of a city, is exercising strictly legislative 
functions. When, however, the focus shifts from the entire city to one 
specific tract of land for which a zoning change is urged, the function 
becomes more quasi-judicial than legislative. While policy is involved, 
such a proceeding requires a weighing of the evidence, a balancing of 
the equities, an application of rules, regulations and ordinances to 
facts, and a resolution of specific issues. Keopf v. City of Sterling 
Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 120 (1974); Fleming v. City of 
Tacoma, 81 Wash.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972); Fasano v. Washington 
Co. Comm., 264 Or. 574, 574 P.2d 23 (1973); and See Zoning 
Amendments -- The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 
Ohio State Law Journal 130 (1972). 
584 P.2d at 135. 
The Kansas Supreme Court analysis in Golden v. City of Overland Park, 
had been followed in Colorado, Montana, Washington and Oregon. The Golden 
decision was cited in Burt v. City of Idaho Falls, 105 Idaho at 68. The two or 
three year process of adoption of a new comprehensive plan by a city or a 
county for its entire area is a legislative action which should be immune from 
challenge by a· single owner of an isolated parcel. 
The action taken by the city or county for amendment upon application of 
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the owners of a specific tract of land for which a zone change will be ultimately 
sought is a quasi-judicial action subject to judicial review. 
Idaho Code §67-5270 (3) grants an absolute right of judicial review by a 
party aggrieved by a final order in a contested case. The six volumes of agency 
record with hundreds of letters and petition signatures of protest and the two 
volumes of transcript and weighty and solid evidence that this was a contested 
case. 
2. Powderhorn Amendment on Specific Properties 
Powderhorn in its brief quotes from Cooper v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 411, 614 P.2d 947, 951 (1980): 
Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific 
piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are 
subject to limited review, and may only be attacked upon 
constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority. On the 
other hand, a determination whether the permissible use of a specific 
piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial· 
authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test . .. 
Basically, this test involves the determination of whether the action 
produces a general rule or policy which is applicable to an open class 
of individuals, interest, or situations, or whether it entails the 
application of a general rule or policy to specific individuals, interests, 
or situations. If the former determination is satisfied, there is 
legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied, the action is 
judicial. 
Powderhom Brief, p. 17. 
Powderhom designates this quote as the "Cooper Rule." So be it. Let us 
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apply it precisely to the amendment to change the comprehensive plan on 3,000 
acres on the Powderhom Peninsula. 
The comprehensive plan amendment (a) was not an ordinance and (b) was 
in regard to a specific piece of property. Three thousand acres is a large piece 
of property, but not compared to the total Kootenai County size of 1,310 square 
miles.<3) IDAHO BLUE BOOK 1999-2000, p. 223. The amendment did in 
fact when adopted allow for the change in use of specific pieces of property. 
Exercise of judicial authority to determine the propriety of that change is 
appropriate. 
The comprehensive plan amendment did not produce a general rule or 
policy applicable to an open class of individuals, interests or situations except 
for those in the immediate vicinity who would be adversely impacted by greatly 
increased traffic and dense developments. There was no open class of 
individuals, interest or situation elsewhere in the county impacted by the 
amendment. 
The comprehensive plan amendment applied to specific individuals. The 
intervention of Powderhom and of Magnuson in this suit identified those 
specific individuals and interests and situations to which the amendment (not an 
3640 acres X 1,310 square miles= 838,400 acres; 3,000 divided by 838,400 = .004%. 
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ordinance) applied. As set forth in the motion to intervene filed December 14, 
2006, there were at all times in reality only five property owners owning nearly 
all of the 3,000 acres who sought the amendment to the comprehensive plan: 
ii) Heartland, LLC is the applicant for changes in zoning 
classifications from Agricultural to Rural which is scheduled for 
a hearing before the Kootenai County Hearing Examiner on 
December 21, 2006. 
iii) Heartland, LLC is making the request on behalf of five 
property owners: Powderhorn Co,mmunities, LLC, Charles 
Blakely, East Point Farms, Inc., H.F. Magnuson and Coeur 
d'Alene Land Co. and BLA BAR, (hereinafter "Property 
Owners.") 
Affidavit of Steve Walker. R., Vol. 1, p. 54. 
The boundaries were precisely identified in color for the specific pieces of 
property owned by Powderhom Communities, LLC, Charles Blakely, East Point 
Farms, Inc., H.F. Magnuson and Coeur d'Alene Land Co. and BLA BAR, Inc. 
R., Vol. 1, pp. 63 - 68. 
The Cooper Rule as applied is totally supportive of the district court 
determination that this case was not an exercise of legislative authority by the 
board of county commissioners. 
D. Neighbors Timely Appealed Commissioner Order Allowing 
Amendment 
Powderhorn and Magnuson argue that the November 16th Amended Order 
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of Decision replaced the November 9th Order of Decision and that Neighbors 
should have appealed from the Amended Decision on November 16, 2006. 
District Judge Hosack correctly ruled that the Decisions were identical and that a 
second appeal would have been surplusage. 
The Amended Order of Decision entered November 16, 2006 made 
significant (and insupportable) changes in the findings of fact and in the 
comprehensive, plan analysis. The latter is another form of fact findings 
attempting to match the found facts with the comprehensive plan goals. 
The findings of fact and comprehensive plan analysis together with the 
conclusions of law are the administrative planning and zoning and board of 
commissioners equivalent of a trial court memorandum decision or opinion. As 
such, there is qot something from which an appeal can be made. 
In Hamblen v. Goff 90 Idaho 180, 409 P.2d 429 (1965), defendants filed 
a notice of appeal from the opinion and from the findings and conclusions but 
not from the judgment subsequently entered. The Idaho Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal: 
The opinion contains only the reasoning of the trial judge, and the 
authorities considered in arriving at his decision. The findings and 
conclusions are only what they purport to be. They contain the 
conclusion of the court as to the judgment to be entered. They are 
not in form a judgment, and contain no order for the execution of the 
judgment of lien foreclosure therein directed to be entered. They did 
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not constitute a final judgment appealable under I.C. §13-201. 
90 Idaho at 182. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Blaine County Investment Co. v. Mays, 52 
Idaho 381, 15 P.2d 734 (1932) had made a similar observation: 
A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in 
an action or proceeding. (C.S. sec. 6826.) As the judgment is based 
upon the decision, i.e., the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it 
follows that such findings and conclusions cannot be considered as a 
final judgment or order within the meaning of C.S., see. 7152, from 
which an appeal will lie, and the attempted appeal therefrom is 
therefore dismissed. 
52 Idaho at 384. 
Although Judge Burnett subsequently found a way to bail out a pro-se 
plaintiff in Kugler v. Northwest Aviation, Inc., 108 Idaho 884, 702 P.2d 922 
(App. 1985), his initial conclusion was the same as the above cases: 
The attorney's notice of appeal, filed on January 18, 1983, recites that 
the appeal is taken from an amended "memorandum decision" dated 
November 28, 1982. It fails to mention the judgment entered in the. 
meantime. A district judge's memorandum decision is not appealable 
unless it disposes of an appeal from the magistrate division. When a 
district court acts as a trial court, an appeal may be taken only from 
a final judgment or as otherwise provided in Idaho Appellate Rules 
11 and 12. 
105 Idaho at 886. 
In the administrative procedure, the last paragraph "VII Order of 
Decision" is the equivalent of a judgment. Both orders of decision approved the 
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request by Powderhom Communities for a comprehensive plan map amendment 
from "Agricultural" to "Rural." 
The November 16th document amended the factual findings but did not 
alter in the slightest the original order of decision. If findings of fact cannot 
constitute an appealable order, then changing the findings of fact cannot 
constitute a different order of decision. 
E. Amendment to Petition to Allow Declaratory Judgment was 
Allowable. 
On February 7, 2007, Neighbors filed an amended petition for judicial 
review. The amendment duplicated the first three causes of action, but deleted 
the request that Commissioner Katie Brodie be barred from participation upon 
remand. Brodie had been voted out of office. 
The amendment added a fourth cause of action for declaratory judgment. 
Rule 15 (a) I.R.Civ.P. provides that a party may amend the party's pleading 
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is filed. 
Powderhorn and Magnuson moved to strike the amendment having already 
moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Neighbors responded with the 
assertion that a motion to dismiss was not a responsive pleading buttressed by 
the pages from Vol. 6, Wright-Miller-Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, §§1482-1483, pp. 580-589. 
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As is discussed, elsewhere, the term "responsive pleading" as used in 
Rule 15 (a) must be interpreted in conjunction with the description of 
the pleadings allowed .in federal court actions set forth in Rule 7 (a) 
The language of Rule 7 (a) indicates that a motion is not a responsive 
pleading. This fact is important because certain motions may be 
made before interposing a responsive pleading . . 
In Drennon v. Fisher, 141 Idaho 942, 120 P.3d 1146 (App. 2005), the 
Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the district court denial of a motion to amend 
in a habeas corpus proceeding with these dispositive words: 
Additimially, we note that Drennon was entitled to amend his petitiov. 
even without leave of the district court. Under the provisions of 
I.R.C.P. 15 (a), "[a] party may amend the party's pleading once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served .. 
. . " A motion to dismiss does not constitute a responsive pleading 
within the meaning of this rule. See I.R.C.P. 7 (a) and 15 (a); O'Neil 
v. Schuckardt, 116 Idaho 507, 509, 777 P.2d 729, 731 (1989); Sinclair 
Marketing, Inc. v. Siepert, 107Idaho 1000, 1005- 06, 695 P.2d 385, 
390-391 (1985); Bowden v. United States, 176 F.3d 552, 555, (D.C. Cir. 
1999). 
141 Idaho at 946. 
Neighbors had a right to file the amended pleading adding the fourth 
cause of action without seeking leave of the court. Leave to amend must be 
freely given. Spur Products Corporation v. Stoel Rivers, LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 
44, 122 P.3d 300, __ (2005). Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 
604, 612, 114 P.3d 974, _(2005). 
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F. Remand for Second Hearing Mandatory 
The major issue to be decided upon this appeal is whether Judge Hosack 
was legally correct in ordering a remand to the board of county commissioners 
to require a second hearing as directed by Idaho Code §67-6509 (a). In making 
that decision, Judge Hosack relied not just upon the code section, but also upon 
the interpretation given to that section by this court in Price v. Payette County, 
131 Idaho 426, 958 P.2d 583 (1998). R., Vol. 3, pp. 594-598. An excerpt from 
the Memorandum Decision gives a succinct summary: 
In the case at bar, the Planning Commission voted to deny the 
applicant Powderhorn's proposed amendment to the Comprehensive 
Plan. The Planning Commission sent its recommendation to the 
Board. The Board held a hearing, and then approved the application 
to amend the Comprehensive Plan. As required by §67-6509 (b), 
Idaho Code, and by the holding in Price, the Board was required to 
hold a second or further hearing, on the proposed amendment to the 
Comprehensive Plan, before the Comprehensive Plan could be 
amended. 
R., Vol. J, p. 596. 
Understandably both appellants have great difficulty in trying to argue that 
Judge Hosack erred in relying on the clear wording of Idaho Code §67-6509 (b) 
and the opinion in Price v. Payette County. 
The Pmyderhom brief skirts the merits by first asserting that there was no 
material change between the planning commission rejection and board of 
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commissioners acceptance of the amendment. Then the argument is made that: 
Even assuming the Board's Final Order was made upon unlawful 
procedure, or violated any other subsection of Idaho Code §67-
5279(3), the Board's Final Order must be affirmed by a reviewing 
court unless a substantial right of the appellant has been prejudiced. 
Appellant Brief of Powderhorn, p. 34. 
This statement is followed by citation to Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 
Idaho 575, 917 P.2d 409 (Ct. App. 1996). That opinion concludes, not by 
excusing or ratifying code violations by the City of Boise, but with this next to 
last sentence: 
The Council's decision, which modified the P & Z Commission's 
decision, was authorized by the Boise City Code and is supported by 
substantial competent evidence in the record. 
128 Idaho at 579. 
Appellants Magnuson and Coeur d'Alene Land Company, recognizing that 
it was better to dodge the issue than to make an insupportable argument, punted: 
Appellants Magnuson incorporate herein as though set forth in full 
the argument and authority advanced by Appellants Powderhorn in 
support of the foregoing propositions at pp. 27 - 37 of their Opening 
Brief. 
Magnuson Brief, p. 24. See also same "incorporation" of Powderhom 
Brief in Magnuson Brief at page 19. 
The Powderhom arguments will be dealt with in the order set forth with 
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the Powderhorn captions. 
"a. The issue of compliance with Idaho Code §67-6509 should not 
have been addressed on appeal to the district court since it was not 
raised before the Board." (NO!) 
There was only one public hearing on the merits before the board 
occurring on September l 4, 2006. At that hearing, the board listened but gave 
no indication of its decision. Appellant's argument is that a protesting citizen 
was supposed to say, "and if you decide against the planning commission, you 
must have a second hearing." 
The vote of approval rejecting the planning commission reconunendations 
occurred on October 6, 2006 with the final decision made without further 
hearing on November 9, 2006. The board amended its fact finding on 
November 16, ,2006 with no notice and no public hearing. 
A court has the inherent power to find its own law and to make sua 
sponte rulings at any time prior to entry of final judgment. Rule 11 (a)(2) (B), 
I.R.Civ.P. Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 784-85, 69 P.3d 
1035, ~-(2003). 
Fault can be laid upon counsel for all parties for not discovering Idaho 
Code §67-6509 (a) and Price v. Payette County, at an earlier stage. However, 
a trial court is never, ever confined to limiting its consideration of legal issues 
30 
solely to the briefs and arguments of the parties. 
"b. The Board complied with all the requirements of Idaho Code 
§67-6509(b ). " (NO!) 
Powderhom attempts to convert the hearing on October 4, 2006 on the 
issue of whether board members had improperly engaged in discourse with the 
applicants in a site visit into the required second hearing to look again at the 
negative recommendation of the planning commission. Chairman Johnson under 
direction from. county attorney Cafferty strictly limited the October 4th public 
hearing: 
BY CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We're going to open the public 
meeting. Uh, what this is going to deal with is a site visit the 
Commissioners uh at the Powderhorn site. All testimony today will 
be specific to that, there will be no new information besides what had 
happened during the site visit. 
Transcript, p. 212, L. 23 - 25; p. 213, L. l - 2. 
The following is an application of the statutory wording in §67-6509 (b) 
to the dates of record. 
(b) The governing board, as provided by local ordinance, prior to 
adoption, amendment, or repeal of the plan, may conduct at least one 
(1) public hearing, in addition to the public hearing(s) conducted by 
the commission, using the same notice and hearing procedures as the 
commission. (Emphasis supplied). 
April 27, 2006 Public hearing before Kootenai County Planning 
Commission. 
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May 20, 2006 Planning Commission voted unanimously to 
recommend denial of the amendment. 
The governing board shall not hold a public hearing, give notice of a 
proposed hearing, nor take action upon the plan, amendments, or 
repeal until recommendations have been received from the 
commission. 
September 14, 2006 
October 4, 2006 
Public hearing before the Kootenai County Board 
of Commissioners. 
Public hearing before Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners limited to site visit issues. 
Following consideration by the governing board, if the governing 
board makes a material change in the recommendation or alternative 
options contained in the recommendation by the commission concerning 
adoption, amendment or repeal of a plan, further notice and hearing shall 
be provided before the governing board adopts, amends or repeals the plan. 
October 5, 2006 
November 9, 2006 
November 16, 2006 
Commissioners Johnson and Brodie voted to 
grant amendment. Commissioner Currie vote 
0 no." 
Commissioners Johnson and Brodie signed Order 
of Decision granting amendment as sought. 
Commissioners signed Amended Order of 
Decision. 
1. Board Approval was a Material Change 
The approval of the amendment was a material change from the denial 
recommended by the planning commission. There was no further public hearing 
after November 9th. 
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Only after the Board follows the correct procedures on remand in 
amending the Comprehensive Plan can the Board consider Bone's 
request for an amendment to the zoning ordinances. 
Price v. Payette County, 131 Idaho at 430. 
Powderhom further argues that the decision of the board of commissioners 
rejecting the recommendation of the planning commission was not a "material 
change." Powderhom Brief, pp. 32 - 33. That argument ranges from 
disingenuous to the ridiculous. "No" is the same as "Yes?" A red light is not 
materially different from a green light? 
The decision of the planning commission was not confined to waiting for 
the new comprehensive plan. The transcript of the planning commission hearing 
on May 25, 2006 includes the following conclusions by commissioner Triplett 
joined in with a unanimous vote by the other members: 
By Commissioner Triplett. .. Uh, there has not been a substantial 
change that has occurred in the actual conditions of the area that 
justifies the Amendment. Uh, the proposed Amendment does conflict 
with Goals 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17 and 22. 
Transcript, p. 15, L. 6 - 9. 
The board of commissioners, or more likely the staff, recognized that in 
the Order made November 9, 2006, the board had adopted the findings of fact 
· made by the planning commission in recommending against the amendment. 
The result was the Amended Order made November 16, 2006 which made 
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numerous material changes in those findings and in the comprehensive plan 
analysis. 
Appellants argue that all of the protestors at the public hearing and those 
writing letters in opposition that filled four volumes of the record had no rights 
and would not be prejudiced by the comprehensive plan amendment that would 
open the zoning gate to 1,300 residences. 
Powderhom and Magnuson sought to amend the comprehensive plan in 
order to rezone and carry out their intensive development. The argument here of 
Powderhorn that no substantive rights of the investors would be violated is, in 
essence, an argument that the comprehensive plan is meaningless and has no 
effect. 
The applicants for amendment of the comprehensive plan were seeking to 
obtain substantial new development rights upon their properties owned within 
the 3,000 acres on the Powderhorn Peninsula. 
Those opposing the amendment were largely nearby property owners·and 
residents who believed with good cause that approval of the amendment to the 
comprehensive· plan leading to rezoning would have negative impacts upon their 
property rights and lifestyle. 
Six volumes of transcripts consisting largely of letters in opposition and 
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the two volume transcript of the hearings are weighty evidence that the 
substantial rights of Neighbors and all those represented thereby would be 
prejudiced by the approval of the amendment. 
G. Attorney's Fees not Allowable to Anyone 
Neither appellant is entitled to attorney's fees. Appellant Powderhorn 
seeks attorney'-s fees predicated upon the favorable decision by this court. 
Appellant Magnuson adopts the Powderhorn argument without elaboration. 
Not for the first time, counsel for Powderhorn has misread the law by 
total reliance qn Idaho Code § 12-117. That statute cited in full at page 39 of 
the Powderhorn brief allows for the award of the attorney's fees to "a person" 
(not from a person) from "A state agency, a city, a county or other taxing 
district" when :the judgment is rendered determining that the governmental 
agency "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
Neighbors for Responsible Growth and its associate non-profit entities and 
individuals are not governmental agencies. Kootenai County did what 
Powderhorn and Magnuson wanted it to do. Respondent Neighbors et al are the 
"person" who prevailed and who could conceivably make a claim for attorney's 
fees against Kootenai County, but not against Powderhorn or Magnuson. Such 
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claim is not asserted by respondents. Attorney's fees from the opposing parties 
are not available to any one in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
District Judge Hosack correctly ruled that the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners in 2006 erred by not holding a second hearing as required by 
Idaho Code §67-6509 (a) after making material changes to the recommendation 
of the planning commission. 
In Davisco Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 
118 P. 3d 116 ;(2005), a concentrated animal feed lot case, Justice Jones wrote a 
dissent with observations that should become law in future cases. Justice Jones 
believed that when the county board of commissioners reversed a decision of the 
planning and zoning commission, it had a legal duty to give adequate reasons: 
Just as agencies must issue a reasoned statement for their conclusions-
- I.C. §67-5248 (which requirement formed part of the basis for the 
court's rule in Woodfield, see 127 Idaho at 746, 905 P.2d at 1053) - so, 
too, must county boards of commissioners issue a reasoned statement 
explaining their decisions under LLUPA. I.C. §67-6535. If the AP A's 
reasoned statement requirement produced the rule in Woodfield, one 
could reasonably conclude the rule would apply to decisions that must 
conform to I.C. §67-6535. 
141 Idaho at 794. 
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The judgment appealed from must be affirmed and remanded to the 
current Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. 
Respectfully submitted, this 2nd day 
of April, 2008. 
Scott W. Reed 
Attorney for Respondents 
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APPENDIX A 
The following are excerpts from the Findings of Fact and from the 
Comprehensive Plan Analysis taken from the November 9, 2006 Order of 
Decision (Agency Record, Vol. 3, pp. 601 - 613) and the November 16, 2006 
Amended Order of Decision. Agency Record; Vol 3, p. 590 - 600. 
FlNDlNGS OF FACT 
NOVEMBER 9TH 
2.05 Zoning. Much of the property on the Powderhorn peninsula is zoned 
Agricultural. This zone has a minimtjim lot size of five (5) acres. 
There is some property associated with this request that is zoned 
Restrictive Residential with a minimum lot size of 8,250 square feet. 
There is also property zoned Rural with a minimum lot size of five (5) 
acres. (Exhibit -11, Zone Map) 
NOVEMBER 16TH 
2.05 Zoning. Approxiinately 43% of the l'owderhorn peninsula is zoned 
Agricultural. This zone has a minimum lot size of five (5) acres. The 
balance of the property on the peninsula, approximately 57%, is 
zoned Restricted Residential or Rural. The Restricted Residential 
Zone has a minimum lot size of 8,250 square feet. The Rural zone 
has a minimum lot size of five (5) acres. (Exhibit S-11, Zone Map). 
* * * * 
NOVEMBER 9TH 
2.10 Area of City Impact. The southeast portion of this property is 
located within the City of Harrison's Area of City Impact. 
-1-
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NOVEMBER 16TH. 
2.10 Area of City Impact. The southeast portion· of this property is 
located within the City of Harrison's Area of City Impact. According 
to Kootenai County Ordinance No. 211, "the purpose of establishing 
the Harrison Area of City Impact is to identify an urban fringe area 
adjoining the City of Harrison, Idaho." 
* * * * 
NOVEMBER 9TH 
2.14 Fire Protection. The subject property is within the boundaries of the 
East Side Fire District. In a Comment Card dated January 5, 2006, 
Fire Marshall Michael Brannan stated that the District had no 
comments. (Exhibit PA-7, Commend Card). 
NOVEMBER 16TH 
2.14 Fire Protection. The subject property is within the boundaries of the 
East Side Fire District. The District has an unmanned fire station 
within the subject property. In a Comment Card dated January 5, 
2006, Fire Marshall Michael Brannan stated that the District had no 
comments. In a letter dated August 29, 2006, Fire Marshall Brannan 
wrote that the District "will be able to serve Powderhorn Ranch" if 
all the standards and commitments in Powderhorn's letter to them 
are implemented. (Exhibit PA-7, Comment Card; Exhibit PA-10, 
Letter). 
* * * * 
NOVEMBER 9TH 
2.15 School Distdct. The subject property is within the boundaries of the 
Kootenai School District #273. The District was asked to comment on 
this request but has not done so. 
-2-
1 86 
NOVEMBER 16TH 
2.15 School District. The subject property is within the boundaries of the 
Kootenai School District #273. In a letter dated August 15, 2006, the 
District stated that "there are no adverse impacts expected from this 
development." (Exhibit P A-9. Letter). 
* * * * 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN ANALYSIS 
NOVEMBER 9TH 
Goal 6: Encourage the preservation, protection, and enhancement of 
fish and wildlife habitats. 
The Department of Fish & Game responded that the de1,elopment 
of this property would have a negative impact on wildl(fe. · 
NOVEMBER 16TH 
Goal 6: Encourage the preservation, protection, and enhancement of 
fish and wildlife habitats. 
The Idaho Department of Fish & Game responded that the 
development of this property would have a negative impact on 
wildlife. With proper design, impacts on wildlife can be 
minimized and habitat can be improved for some species. 
* * * * 
NOVEMBER 9TH 
Population 
4.04 Goal 10: Guide population growth to allow for inevitable expansion 
without sacrificing the environment or the quality of life, 
which currently characterizes Kootenai County. 
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Because it is proposed to be a seasonal, destination 
community it is uncertain how the proposed increase in 
dwelling units will llffect the overall population growth in 
the area. The ultimate development has the potential to 
guide population growth to an area of the County that 
currently has very sparse population. If approved, air and 
water quality should not be negatively affected; however, 
existing wildlife habitat and corridors will be severely 
affected. Additionally, this' request will have a dramatic 
affect on the quality of life to the property owners of the 
area. 
However, the proposed change to Rural, from Agricultural, 
will maintain the character of the area and comport with 
the actual use of the requested properties as well as the 
surrounding areas. 
NOVEMBER 16TH 
Population 
4.04 Goal 10: Guide population growth :to allow for inevitable expansion 
without sacrificing the environment or the quality of life, 
which currently characterizes Kootenai County. 
The proposed change to Rural, from Agricultural, will 
maintain the character of the area and comport with the 
actual use of the requested properties as well as the 
surrounding areas. 
* * * * 
NOVEMBER 9TH 
Economic Development 
4.06 Goal 12: Promote a diversified, safe, and stable economic base in 
an environmentally responsible manner. 
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Goal 13: Maintain viable agricultural, forestry, and mining land 
uses. 
The proposed amendment allows for the further de\/elopment of the 
property and contributes to the creatio1t of jobs a1td a1t imprm1ed 
economic base for the regio1t. 1¥ith the development of this property, 
the marginal agricultural use and the forestry use will be eliminated. 
NOVEMBER 16TH 
Economic Development 
4.06 Goal 12: Promote a diversified, safe, and stable economic base in 
an environmentally responsible manner. 
Goal 13: Maintain viable agricultural, forestry, and mining land 
uses. 
The proposed amendment allows for tlte further development of the 
property and contributes to the creation of jobs and an improved 
economic base for the region. The Applicant has demonstrated that 
agriculture and forestry are not economically viable in this area. 
NOVEMBER 9TH 
Community Design 
4.11 Goal 26: Foster growth in a manner, which does not compromise 
the visual qualities of Kootenai County. 
Goal 27: Preserve, protect, and enhance natural landmarks and 
areas of scenic beauty, such as waterways and unique 
landscapes. 
The public comment generated by this request suggests that this 
amendment, to the extent that it culminates in subsequent development, 
will compromise the visual qualities o_fKootenai County. 
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NOVEMBER 16TH 
Community Design 
4.11 Goal 26: Foster growth in a manner, which does not compromise 
the visual qualities of Kootenai County. 
Goal 27: Preserve, protect, and enl.j.ance natural landmarks and 
areas of scenic beauty, such as waterways and unique 
landscapes. 
The visual impact of any proposed deJ1elopment will be addressed 
in subsequent development applitations. The peninsula is not 
considered a natural landmark o'r unique landmark. 
* * * * 
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APPENDIX B 
TIMELINE ON COURSE OF PROCEEDlNGS 
CASE NO. CP-080-05 
December 16, 2005 
April 27, 2006 
May 20, 2006 
June 16, 2006 
September 14, 2006 
September 25, 2006 
October 4, 2006 
October 5, 2006 
November 9, 2006 
November 15, 2006 
November 16, 2006 
Powderhom Communities, LLC filed Request for 
Amendment to Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan 
for 3,000 acres on Powderhom Peninsula. 
Public hearing before Kootenai County Planning 
Commission. 
Planning Commission voted unanimously to deny 
amendment. 
Rand Wichman resigned as Director of Kootenai 
County Building and Planning Department. 
Public hearing before the Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners. 
Site visit by Board of Commissioners. 
Public hearing before Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners limited to site visit issues. 
Commissioners Johnson and Brodie voted to grant 
amendment. Commissioner Currie voted "no." 
Commissioners Johnson and Brodie signed Order of 
Decision granting amendment as sought. 
Petitioners filed Petition for Review and served 
summons on county clerk. 
Commissioners signed Amended Order of Decision in 
which the Findings of Fact and Comprehensive 
Analysis were substantially changed from those signed 
November 9, 2006. 
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